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I. InterdisciplinaryProspects
The dominant strains of corporate governance theory are far removed
from the scholarship in employment and discrimination law. The two fields
occupy distant workspaces and almost never talk to each other. The principal
reason is that most corporate legal scholars have deliberately defined their
field so that it addresses only a single, if crucial, subject: the allocation of
control over firms between managers and suppliers of capital-investors. 1 So
* Copyright 2004, Donald C. Langevoort, Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center. This work was supported by the Georgetown-Sloan
Project on Business Institutions. Thanks to Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Kathy Stone, Margaret
Blair, Mitu Gulati, Kim Krawiec, participants of the Washington & Lee Symposium on Critical
Race Theory, the NYU Conference on Behavioral Analyses of Workplace Discrimination, and
faculty workshops at Georgetown and the University of North Carolina for their encouragement
and suggestions.
1. For the most recent celebration of this perspective, see Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The End ofHistoryfor CorporateLaw, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) ("There is no longer
any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase longterm shareholder value.").
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restricted, the field leaves to others the task of thinking about the legal
relationships between the firm and other stakeholders, including those who
supply its labor.
Some corporate scholars chafe under this restricted vision and seek to
redefine the boundaries of corporate law so as to encourage2--or in some cases
even require3-the board of directors to take into account the interests of
employees, bringing employment law and corporate law into closer contact.
But their project has yet to gain anything close to the upper hand. Some of the
resistance is no doubt ideological-there is a strong conservative streak within
the community of corporate scholars, and many of the critics of the narrow
vision of corporate law have an openly progressive agenda. I suspect, though,
that others fear that the field will lose its intellectual specialty if it expands too
far in the direction of open-ended constructs like "team production"4 or
"connected contracts. ,5 Yet regardless of the eventual scholarly consensus on
whether corporate law should shift away from exclusive attention to investor
interests, the corporate theory informing that inquiry uses a much wider-angled
lens. Economists, whose ideas orthodox corporate law scholars habitually
borrow, certainly have no similar self-imposed limits on their interests.
"Theory of the firm" work translates into a strong interest in employment
contracts and structural relationships, resulting in a melding of economics and
human resources. 6 Economists studying the principal-agent problem have long
2. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBIITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST
EXPORT 118-19 (2001) (suggesting that the legal duties owed to shareholders by the board of
directors should be relaxed to allow for greater concern for the corporation's other
stakeholders).
3. See Kent Greenfield, UsingBehavioral Economics to Show the PowerandEfficiency
of CorporateLaw as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 607-08 (2002) (broadening
fiduciary duties to include a duty to employees); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital
Era: Reconceptualizing CorporateLaw to FacilitateLabor-Management Cooperation,78
CORNELL L. REV. 899, 950-53 (1993) (discussing actions taken by courts and legislatures that
have allowed a board of directors to consider the interests of other stakeholders when important
strategic decisions are made). An older strand of this thinking with European roots advocates
the placement of labor representatives on corporate boards of directors. E.g., Katherine Van
Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging
Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 158-59 (1988) (discussing the presence of a labor
representative on the board of directors as a possible way to protect labor's interests).
4. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team ProductionTheory of CorporateLaw, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 249 (1999).
5. G. Mitu Gulati et al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887, 894 (2000).
6. See generally JAMES N. BARON & DAVID M. KREPs, STRATEGIC HUMAN RESOURCES:
FRAMEWORKS FOR GENERAL MANAGERS (1999); PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS,
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT (1992).
The "principal-agent" problem is one of

the organizing ideas of this literature with an immense influence on the study of corporate
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been interested in institutional arrangements that optimize the efficiency and
productivity of the firm, something hardly limited to the resolution of conflicts
between managers and investors.
Since the early 1970s, work in corporate law has closely followed the
interests of the economists, and it continues to follow in this direction.7
Having gained some fluency with more expansive ideas about how firms are
organized, scholars who think of themselves as "corporate" are seeing
connections to other legal disciplines and are applying their skills and insights
to problems in the borderland. I suspect that this expansion of interests will
gradually transform "scholarship of the firm." Following the lead of corporate
scholars like Margaret Blair, more attention will be paid to institutional
arrangements-both contract and legal design-that facilitate productivity
through more sophisticated approaches to human resources within
organizations. 8 We already see some signs of this increased attention in work
on "virtual corporations" 9 and in David Millon's exploration of employment
security inside the firm.10 Stephen Bainbridge's writing on the connections
between corporate decisionmaking and participatory workgroup
governance law. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-10
(1976) (describing the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and
management inherent in corporations as legal entities).
7. One benefit from this movement is as an antidote to the myopia that comes from too
much focus on the manager-investor connection. Simply by way of illustration, securities law
scholarship looks at the matter of corporate discourse solely through the lens of managementinvestor communications. Most corporate communications, however, have audiences other than
investors that have not really been taken into account by securities regulation. See Donald C.
Langevoort, Half-Truths: ProtectingMistaken Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 87, 103-04 (1999) (describing different types of corporate communications that are
addressed to audiences other than the corporation's shareholders).
8. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Firm-SpecificHuman Capital and Theoriesof the Firm,
in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 74-80 (Margaret Blair & Mark Roe eds., 1999)
(addressing various institutional arrangements designed to retain employees in an effort to retain
firm-specific human capital). For a perspective outside the corporate perspective, see Katherine
Van Wezel Stone, PolicingEmployment ContractsWithin the Nexus-of-Contracts Firm,43 U.
TORONTO L.J. 353, 376 (1993) (suggesting that unions be allowed to participate in strategiclevel corporate decisions so as to put labor on an "equal footing with all other contenders for
power within the concern"); Katherine V. W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract:
Implicationsof the Changing Workplacefor Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV.
519, 568-72 (2001) (describing the new psychological contract as general training, marketbased pay, and networking opportunities instead of job security and internal promotions).
9. See generally Claire Moore Dickerson, Spinning Out of Control: The Virtual
Organizationand Conflicting Governance Vectors, 59 U. Prrr. L. REV. 759 (1998).
10. See generally David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution,and CorporateLaw
Reform: Employment at Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 975 (1998).
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arrangements" is another nice inquiry into this type of issue, as is-in a very
different direction-research by Stewart Schwab and Randall Thomas on
the
12
exercise of shareholder voting rights by labor unions and pension plans.
This Article follows in that spirit. Once we open the corporate
governance/human resources nexus to deeper inquiry, mutual scholarly interest
in diversity and discrimination follows naturally.' 3 Firms have complex
motives to take nondiscrimination and the promotion of diversity seriously.
First, at least certain forms of discrimination are both unlawful and socially
illegitimate and hence present threats of potential liability and injury to
reputation. Second, human resources demands are such that attracting and
motivating a diverse workforce is a competitive imperative. At the same time,
however, offsetting economic forces may exist that favor subtle forms of
discrimination and hostility to diversity, even if intentional and overt racial or
gender-based bias is mostly outdated.14 In sum, the process of promoting

11. Stephen M. Bainbridge, ParticipatoryManagement Within a Theory ofthe Firm, 21 J.
CORP. L. 657, 680-84 (1996) (finding that participatory management improves corporate
decisionmaking by efficiently channeling information obtained from low-level employees to the
proper decisionmaker).
12. See generally Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate
Governance: ShareholderActivism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1018 (1998). My
suspicion is that a similar blending will occur along the boundaries between corporate law and
intellectual property law, creating something of a triangulation of interests.
13. 1 do not suggest that this particular nexus is entirely unexplored-scholarship is
emerging on a number of dimensions relating to corporate law. E.g., Steven Ramirez, A Flaw in
the Sarbanes-OxleyReform: Can Diversity in the Boardroom Quell CorporateCorruption,77
ST. Jo- 's L. REv. 837, 837-40 (2003) (suggesting that boards of directors with diverse
memberships are more likely to scrutinize the business because the members have fewer shared
common characteristics); Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discriminationandthe Relationship Between
the DirectorialDuty of Careand CorporateDisclosure,63 U. Prrr. L. REv. 389,413-16 (2002)
(advocating that unadjudicated and adjudicated discriminatory conduct be disclosed to
investors). The economics literature on discrimination is extensive. See generally Joseph G.
Altonji & Rebecca M. Blank, Race and Gender in the Labor Markets, in 3C HANDBOOK OF
LABOR ECONOMICS 3143 (Orley Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds., 1999); Brian L. Goff et al.,
RacialIntegration as an Innovation: EmpiricalEvidencefrom Sports Leagues, 92 Am. ECON.
REv. 16 (2002) (finding that sports teams with racially integrated teams performed better than
nonintegrated teams); Paul Milgrom & Sharon Oster, Job Discrimination,Market Forcesand
the Invisibility Hypothesis, 102 Q.J. EcON. 453 (1987) (finding that racial discrimination is
caused in part by the lack of visibility of minorities in the labor market).
14. See Frances J. Milliken & Luis L. Martins, Searching for Common Threads:
Understandingthe Multiple Effects of Diversity in OrganizationalGroups, 21 AcAD. MGMT.
REv. 402, 420 (1996) (stating that "groups and organizations will act systematically to drive out
individuals who are different from the majority, unless this tendency to drive out diversity is
managed"); see also Altonji & Blank, supra note 13, at 3168-76 (examining different models
that explain statistical data suggesting the presence of ongoing discrimination in labor markets
for women and blacks).
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diversity and ending discrimination, whether to avoid liability or simply to
remain competitive, is a difficult challenge faced by many firms. 5 It demands
a close look at the efficacy of the internal decisionmaking and authority
structures of the firm.
Two recent papers piqued my interest in the connection between corporate
governance and diversity initiatives. One, by Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati,
claims that critical race theory has much to gain from taking account of the
managerial literature on the connections between efficiency and homogeneity
inside the firm, and that law and economics, in turn, should take more seriously
the dynamic social construction of race inside the workplace. 16 In other words,
both genres would benefit from constructive dialogue. The other is Susan
Sturm's thoughtful article on "second-generation" discrimination in
organizational settings. 17 At the risk of oversimplification, her point is that
more subtle forms of employment discrimination cannot be eradicated
successfully using old-style legal commands and controls.' 8 Rather, courts and
others wanting to promote diversity have to tweak organizational structures,
setting in motion intrafirm processes that spot and solve problems creatively
and cooperatively. She points to experiences at companies such as Deloitte &
Touche, Intel, and Home Depot as positive examples.19
Carbado and Gulati are pessimistic about countering the subtle pressures
toward homogeneity except by fairly aggressive and vocal means. 20 By
contrast, Sturm's article strikes an optimistic note about possible ways of

15. See Milliken & Martins, supra note 14, at 414-20 (finding not only that diversity
increases the quality of group decisions but also that groups tend to become less diverse over
time).
16. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race
Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1761--64 (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS, DRECTIONS, ANDANEW
CRmcAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., Temple University Press 2002))
(discussing the potential value of collaborative efforts between law and economics and critical
race theory disciplines).
17. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458, 460 (2001).
18. Id. at 460-62.
19. Id. at491-519.
20. They accept that firms are currently pressured to achieve some diversity but will
respond by preferring minority group members who effectively deny their diversity and preserve
the prevailing homogeneity. For a further exploration along these lines dealing with law firms,
see David B. Wilkins, From "Separate is Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity is Good for
Business": The Rise ofMarket-Based Diversity Arguments andthe Fateof the Black Corporate
Bar, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1548, 1567 (2004) (stating that black lawyers were allowed into large
corporate law firms so long as they "were functionally indistinguishable from the white lawyers
that these institutions had always hired").
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addressing second-generation discrimination. 2 l While I hope Sturm is right,
my intuition is that we need to understand the likely points of resistance to
diversity initiatives more fully before making any confident judgment about
what may or may not work in a larger universe of firms. 22 Knowledge of

organizational behavior should be useful here because, although some grounds
for resistance will have distinct racial or gender overtones, others may fall into
the more generic categories familiar to those who study how firms seek to
promote any form of change or redirection among its employees. And the tone
of much of the research about "top-down" efforts to change the embedded
practices and directions within an organization is far from optimistic.

23

We

have to understand the nature of the foreseeable. organizational resistance
before we can deal with it. Through their darker lens, Carbado and Gulati
explore some of these barriers but do not go far enough in playing out the
likely consequences in terms of either the social or the political dynamics
inside the firm. Unfortunately, the existing social science research does not
tell us enough to be highly confident in assessing this problem. Hence, my
contribution, also drawing from the melding of conventional and behavioral
economics with the study of organizational behavior along the lines of much
of the new institutional economics, 24 is speculative.

See generally Sturm, supra note 17.
22. See Parshotam Dass & Barbara Parker, Strategiesfor Managing Human Resource
Diversity: From Resistance to Learning, 13 AcAD. MGMT. ExECUTIvE 68, 72 (1999) (finding
that successful implementation of diversity initiatives depends on the intensity of the external
pressures for promoting diversity and the extent to which management has made diversity a
priority).
23. See, e.g., CHRIS ARGYRIS, OVERCOMING ORGANIZATIONAL DEFENSES: FORMULATING
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 2-3 (1990) (reporting a study that showed that board members
often believe that they have inadequate power to effectively carry out their responsibilities and
address potential management problems); Harvey Leibenstein & Shlomo Maital, The
OrganizationalFoundationsof X-Inefficiency: A Game-Theoretic Interpretationof Argyris'
Model of OrganizationalLearning, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 251, 257 (1994) (finding that
defensive behavior in management is responsible for suboptimal organizational performance);
Nelson P. Repenning & John D. Sterman, Capability Traps and Self-Confirming Attribution
Errors in the Dynamics of Process Improvement, 47 ADMIN. ScL Q. 265, 284-92 (2002)
(arguing that attributing low productivity to flaws in the workforce rather than in the work
processes causes potentially valuable process improvements to be overlooked). For a
fascinating case study of a top-performing group's defense mechanisms and subsequent failure,
see generally Paul Levy, The Nut Island Effect: When Good Teams Go Wrong, HARV. Bus.
21.

REv., Mar. 2001, at 51.
24. For a good overview, see Oliver E. Williamson, Introduction to ORGANIZATION
THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND 3, 9 (Oliver Williamson ed.,

1990) (stating that economics and organizational theory are beginning to blend together).
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A conversation between governance and discrimination scholars about
what happens inside the firm will be productive only if there is an acceptable
common rhetoric. Much of orthodox corporate law work is dominated by the
metaphor of the firm as a "nexus of contracts. ''25 While that may be
understandable as economists broadly understand the word "contract," it is
jarring-and perhaps disturbing-when it takes on a normative connotation
that assumes both legal enforceability and strong contractual "freedom. ,26 A
more inclusive description, from which much of what follows proceeds, is a
"nexus of negotiations": The work among people within corporations is a
series of negotiations that constantly redefine the situation in which the
participants find themselves (negotiations of reality) and how they should
respond (negotiations of power, authority, and action).27 Because reality
changes constantly, any understandings are inevitably temporary, yet they
plainly influence all the construals and choices that follow. One virtue of this
metaphor is that it captures the firm's cognitive and cultural dimensionssomething that by all accounts is28crucial to any deep understanding-whereas
the contract metaphor does not.
In turn, that metaphor also hints at how to be constructive. If the
dominating image within the firm is the complex set of ongoing negotiations,
then the central task of any lawyer, manager, or anyone else who wants to have
an influence is to combine the roles of negotiator and mediator, rather than
acting as an authority figure. Sometimes such a person can bargain for his or
her own version of reality and power. But effective influence will come more
often from being able to intervene in the negotiations among others in the firm
in a way that facilitates a better outcome. Fortunately, much work in
25. See generally Symposium, ContractualFreedom in CorporateLaw, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1395 (1989).
26. Hence, the endless debate among corporate scholars as to whether to allow contractual
"opt-outs" of fiduciary responsibilities. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual
Freedom in CorporateLaw, 89 CoLuM. L. REv. 1365, 1396-97 (1989).
27. The classic texts in organizational behavior take this perspective almost as a given.
See generally JAMES MARCH, DECISIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (1988); JEFFREY PFEIFFER,
MANAGING wrH POWER (1992); KARL E. WEICK, SENSEMAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS (1995). For
my effort to integrate this concept into a legal theory of why corporations commit fraud, see
generally Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
CorporationsMislead Stock Market Investors (and Others), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997).
28. On the influence of firm culture from the standpoint of transaction cost economics, see
generally David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON
POSITIVE POLTICAL ECONOMY 90 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990); David M.
Kreps, The Interaction Between Norms and Economic Incentives: IntrinsicMotivation and
Extrinsic Incentives, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 359 (1997) (discussing the rationale for adhesion to
norms by individuals).
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psychology and economics teaches how to negotiate and mediate better,29 skills
that would be useful in promoting organizational compliance with the law and
with aspirations in promoting diversity and nondiscrimination.
II. Diversity and the CorporatePromotion Tournament
Discrimination can be found at any level of business organization, from
the hiring of blue-collar workers to the high-level decisions on the composition
of the senior executive team. Here, the focus will be on the middle and upper
levels of the organization. The study of middle managers, especially, is a
30
neglected subject in corporate governance and the "legal" theory of the firm.
By all accounts, much of the real work of the organization occurs there. Just as
important, senior managers ascend, at least initially, based on their performance
as middle managers. A better understanding of this world is essential for both
corporate academics and those interested in the fairness of patterns of hiring
31
and promotion within corporations.
From an economics perspective, the standard question in studying
diversity and discrimination in the firm is whether discrimination is, on
average, efficient or inefficient in terms of productivity or profitability. If it is
32
inefficient, as conservative critics of affirmative action habitually point out,
then there is the rosy possibility that patterns of discrimination should whither
away as competition forces its elimination. But this will not occur if either of
two conditions is present individually, much less simultaneously. One
condition is insufficient competition, so that the residual rents can continue to

29.

See generally BARRIERSTOCONFLICTRESOLUTION (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds. 1995);

Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is CreativityPossible in Legal ProblemSolving and Teachable
in Legal Education?,6 HARv. NEG. L. REv. 97 (2001) (discussing an improved legal problem
solving model which includes symbolic and logical thinking as well as "legal creativity").
30. See Gerard Hertig, CorporateGovernance in the United States As Seenfrom Europe,
1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 27, 41 (noting that "[tihe role of middle management as such is
largely ignored" in traditional studies of the internal organization of firms, which instead focus
on the board and its committees or the CEO and top management). For a discussion of middle
managers from the managerial literature, see generally Quy Nguyen Huy, EmotionalBalancing
of OrganizationalContinuity and RadicalChange: The Contributionof Middle Managers,47
ADMIN. Sci. Q. 31 (2002).
31. See Roy Radner, Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing, 30 J. ECON. Lrr. 1382,
1382-84 (1992) (discussing the importance of managing within the modem firm).
32. E.g., Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex DiscriminationLaws, 56 U. Ci.
L. REv. 1311, 1321-25 (1989).
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support a taste or habit for discrimination. The other condition is the
persistence of positive efficiencies to discrimination, a possibility explored a
few years ago by David Charny and Mitu Gulati 33 and elaborated upon more
recently by Gulati and Devon Carbado.34 They identify reasons why
discrimination could be consistent with efficiency, including the possibility that
interactions among employees are more productive when the employees share
common traits-backgrounds, interests, patterns of speech-associated with a
common race or gender.3 5 Trust, a crucial element of work within the firm,
may develop more easily within a homogenous group. Without in any way
doubting that this bias is the product of past discrimination and wholly
illegitimate, the possibility that there are efficiencies to the perpetuation of bias
calls for a different normative approach. Charny and Gulati, drawing from
work by Edward Lazear and Sherwin Rosen, play out this possibility by
thinking through its implications when employment patterns in a firm are
organized in a tournament fashion--one where employees are matched against
each other for eventual selection as one of the small group that becomes the
senior management team with extraordinary status and compensation.36 In this
setting, rational employees make investment decisions in their careers with a
view toward the rewards associated with the large, but risky, winner's prize.37
33. See David Charny & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-Wages, Tournaments, and
Discrimination: A Theory of Employment DiscriminationLaw for "High-Level" Jobs, 33
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57,77-83 (1998) (discussing reasons why an "economically rational"
firm may discriminate). For a further extension of this view critiquing antidiscrimination law
and finding positive externalities associated with a taste for homogeneity, see generally
RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DIscRIMINATION

LAWS (1992).
34. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 16, at 1813 (arguing that outsider groups, such as
women and minorities, may feel the need to do extra "identity work" at their jobs to counter the
stereotypes they perceive themselves subjected to, which may result in lost opportunities and
increased burdens).
35. Chamy & Gulati, supra note 33, at 66-67. Because of this, they suggest, employers
might rationally predict a nonminority candidate to outperform a minority one. See id. at 66
(noting that the costs of integrating minorities into the workplace might arise from the
reluctance of typical workers to cooperate with minority workers because of the different
external characteristics of minorities).
36. See, e.g., Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournamentsas Optimum
Labor Contracts, 89 J. POL. ECON. 841, 847 (1981) (discussing the relationship between
compensation and incentives in relation to output and rank within the firm).
37. In particular, a minority group member might rationally perceive discrimination and
fail to invest as much in the skills necessary to win the tournament or else might be inclined to
take excessive risk. See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, DifferentialAccess to OpportunityandPower,
in DIscRIMINATION IN ORGANIZATIONS: USING SOCIAL INDICATORS TO MANAGE SOCIAL CHANGE

52 (R. Alvarez et al. eds., 1979) (proposing tools to measure whether there is a systematic
disadvantage by race or gender within organizations by examining distributions of opportunity
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I want to explore this same terrain but very differently. First, I want to
relax the rationality assumption considerably, substituting assumptions drawn
from psychology and behavioral economics. Second, I want to drill a bit deeper
into the tournament structure of the firm's promotion practices to ask, as I have
done in another recent work, a8 a largely ignored question (at least by legal
scholars) that is both central from a corporate governance perspective and also
has implications for discrimination and diversity: Are there certain types of
people, in terms of psychological makeup, who are statistically more likely to
win the successive rounds of the internal promotion tournament so that the
makeup of the final winner's circle-the executive suite-is disproportionately
populated by them?
My prediction is that something other than pure-form rationality is likely
to be the dominating trait among the survivors. 39 That is, there may be certain
"unrealistic" cognitive biases that are adaptive in tournament play and thus
rewarded. If this hypothesis is right, we will have a very important corporate
governance insight because the central task of governance is to constrain the
behavior of those granted the largest amount of managerial discretion. Any
special biases within this rarified group need to be understood thoroughly in
order to create the right institutional design. 40 The task is to consider what
those adaptive biases might be and then to think about the implications in
terms not only of governance 4' but also of diversity and discrimination.

and power).
38. E.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the CorporateThermostat: Lessonsfrom the
Recent FinancialScandalsAbout Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design ofInternal
Controls, 95 GEo. L.J. (forthcoming 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
39. Psychologists have long been aware of the economists' predictions and have studied
the presence of cognitive bias in "expert" populations. While experts do indeed think differently
and generally more effectively than the general population, they are by no means immune from
bias.
40. See MICHAEL MACCOBY, THE GAMEsMAN: THE NEw CORPORATE LEADERS 15 (1976)
(noting that the premise of the book is that in order to succeed, any strategy for social change
must take into account corporate managers because of their influence on the work and lives of
others). Maccoby's more recent prediction-which looks good in light of the recent financial
scandals-is that highly narcissistic individuals are likely to become leaders of organizations in
unstable market settings because of their ability to communicate a vision and confidence.
Michael Maccoby, NarcissisticLeaders: The Incredible Pros,the Inevitable Cons, HARv. Bus.
REv., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 69, 69-71. If Maccoby is right, corporate governance experts might
want to take into account the propensity of narcissists to deny and hide the truth.
41. Langevoort, supra note 38.
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Let us begin by taking a closer look at the structure of the tournament.4 2 A
na've account of managerial hiring or promotion is that it is solely skilloriented. In this account, technical skills in doing a specific job dominate the
evaluation process, defining the "merit" on which selection should be based.
But the managerial literature emphasizes something very different. Much of
the time, middle managers are organized into a work team that must, through
the process of ongoing negotiation, solve a sequence of problems in carrying
out its responsibilities and then negotiate with others the perception of how
well or poorly the team performed.43 The common practice in most
corporations is to rotate middle managers through many different work groups,
evaluating each set of performances with a combination of individual and group
assessments. Promotions within the organization are based on these
45
evaluations." One author insightfully calls these "probationary crucibles,
because they require iteratedsuccess if the person in question is to survive and
thrive.
If that is accurate, then we should observe an interesting tension in the
hiring process. On one hand, the firm may want people who are entrepreneurial
("self starters"), who have the kind of ambition, work ethic, and risk tolerance
to perform well as individuals. These, after all, are characteristics associated
with future leadership. At the same time, however, the firm will also recognize
the need to find people who will fit well into the many teams to which they will
be assigned. They will also, then, look for traits like loyalty and "being a team
player," which are not perfectly consistent with the first group of traits.
Put aside for a moment what kind of person best fits this mix ex ante.
Hiring is a heuristic step,46 subject to rigorous, albeit subjective, empirical
42. For simplicity, I will not discuss the role of selection of outsiders in the tournament
structure and assume a contest only among insiders. The selection of outsiders complicates the
matter but not in a way that would change the analysis considerably; outsiders are competing in

tournaments of their own, presumably with similar structures, and by most accounts there is a
bias to insider selection. E.g., William Chan, External Recruitment Versus InternalPromotion,
14 J. LABOR ECON. 555, 556 (1996) (discussing the choice between internal promotion and
external recruitment).
43. See generally Richard A. Guzzo & Marcus W. Dickson, Teams in Organizations:
Recent Research on Performance and Effectiveness, 47 ANN. REv. PSYCH. 307 (1996)
(examining recent research on teams and the factors that influence team effectiveness).
44. For a useful overview, see generally R. D. Avery & K. R. Murphy, Performance
Evaluation in Work Settings, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 141 (1998).
45. ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAzES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 40 (1988).
46. See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 71, 84 (discussing a method for choosing the
most qualified candidate even in the face of embellishment of skills and abilities by the
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testing. That is, the person is put into a team and evaluated periodically.
Success means the possibility of promotion and assignment to another team
with a higher level of responsibility; failure means scrutiny and a cloud over
future prospects, if not immediate termination. There are multiple repetitions
of this game-like process, eventually creating a small subset of survivors who
succeeded repeatedly in play against many competitors.
The standard-and doubtless accurate-account of discrimination in this
setting is that these evaluations are biased at least in part because those in
control (a heavily white male population) construct images over time of what
success means simply by reference to historical patterns 47 that, in turn, reflect
historical domination. Given the "group" structure of much of the managerial
workplace, white males might have a competitive advantage because of their
comfort and familiarity with the language and norms of workgroup
interaction. 48 Indeed, there is a body of literature that links homogeneity with
more efficient small group performance for many kinds of tasks.49 If this is the
case, white males would have a continuing advantage simply because of their
primacy in setting the cultural norms and their numerical domination of the
status quo.
That by itself is a plausible but relatively mild form of competitive fitness.
After all, there is also research that shows the benefits of diversity in small
workgroups in terms of quality of decisionmaking.5 ° Moreover, the supposed
benefits of homogeneity gradually erode once a group is established,
especially in a setting that values cooperation or otherwise attains a level of

candidate or third-party "reformers"). See generally John Moran & John Morgan, Employee
Recruiting and the Lake Wobegon Effect, 50 J. ECON. BEHAv. & ORG. 165 (2003).
47. For a recent study on perceptions of men and women on what constitutes a good
manager demonstrating this bias, see generally Laurie A. Rudman & Stephen E. Kilianski,
Implicit and Explicit Attitudes Toward Female Authority, 26 PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. BULL. 1315

(2000).
48. See generally Charny & Gulati, supra note 33. For a good survey of this literature,
see generally Francis Flynn et al., Getting to Know You: The Influence of Personality on
Impressions and Performance of Demographically Different People in Organizations, 46
ADMIN. SCl. Q. 414 (2001).
49. See generally Karen A. Jehn et al., Why Differences Make a Difference: A Field
Study of Diversity,Conflict, and Performancein Workgroups, 44 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 741, 741-42
(1999); Orlando Richard et al., The Impact of Visible Diversity on OrganizationalEffectiveness:
Disclosing the Contentsin Pandora'sBlack Box, 8 J. Bus. & MGT. 265, 268-71 (2002); Anne
S. Tsui et al., Being Different: Relational Demography and OrganizationalAttachment, 37
ADMIN. Sci. Q. 549, 575 (1992).
50. For an overview of the conflicting strands of research in this area, see generally Robin
J. Ely & David A. Thomas, CulturalDiversity at Work: The Effects of Diversity Perspectives
on Work Group Processesand Outcomes, 46 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 229 (2001).
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51

White males hardly have a monopoly on
interpersonal congruence.
cooperative strategies--quite the contrary. In other words, any competitive
resistance to diversity on these grounds should be comparatively fragile.
My hypothesis, however, is that there is something deeper and more
powerful going on inside the tournament. One crucial question, for instance,
has to do with the appetite of executives for risk. Some people argue that the
way to the top of an organization is to play it safe and engage in ingratiation
and other influence tactics with one's superiors. There is something intuitive
about this-but wrong. In highly competitive organizations, the safe strategy
should be dominated by that of the "lucky risk-taker." The executive who takes
significant risks will succeed repeatedly-simply by good fortune-some
percentage of the time. Other times the risk-taking will lead to predictable
failures. If we assume a large population in the organization, some small
percentage of the risk-seekers will hit a lucky streak that will set them apart
from both the risk-seeking losers and the play-it-safers. Association with
unusually good outcomes does much for a career and can become a selffulfilling prophecy as the lucky person is identified as brilliant and given tasks
more likely to bring further success.52
If so, then we might look for biases or traits associated with an aboveaverage appetite for risk. Research in social cognition suggests that the two
traits related to competitive success are a high degree of self-confidence and a
higher than normal propensity to take risk. Self-confidence (optimism about
personal efficacy) is associated with greater persistence, ability to persuade
others, and the like. 53 It also leads to the willingness-perhaps out of blissful
ignorance-to be entrepreneurial and risk-seeking. When rewarded with
51. See Jennifer Chatman & Francis Flynn, The Influence of DemographicHeterogeneity
on the Emergenceand Consequencesof CooperativeNorms in Work Teams, 44 ACAD. MGT. J.
956, 970-71 (2001) (finding that the negative effects of diversity on group functioning fade
over time); see also Jeffrey T. Polzer et al., Capitalizing on Diversity: Interpersonal
Congruence in Small Work Groups, 47 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 296, 316 (2002) (noting that high
interpersonal congruence moderates the negative effects of diversity on group functioning).
52. For a theoretical exploration, see generally Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, SelfConfidence and PersonalMotivation, 117 Q.J. ECON. 871 (2002). On the dangers of such
attributions, see generally Malcolm Gladwell, The Talent Myth: Are Smart PeopleOverrated?,
NEW YORKER, July 22, 2002, at 28.
53. See generally J. EDWARD Russo & PAUL SCHOEMAKER, DECISION TRAPS: TEN
BARRIERS TO BRILLIANT DECISION-MAKING AND How To OVERCOME THEM (1989); MARTIN E. P.
SELIGMAN, LEARNED OPTIMIsM (1990); Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and

Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGT. SCl. 17, 27-29 (1993);
SIMON GERVAIS E7 AL., OVERCONFIDENCE, INVESTMENT POIiCY, AND EXECUTIVE STOCK (Rodney

L. White Center for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 15-20), at http://papers.ssm.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract=361200 (2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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positive feedback, the optimists' self-confidence increases further, and with
both the confidence and the performance, they are given even more attractive
opportunities to succeed in future rounds. 4
That research, in turn, would lead us directly to issues of diversity and
discrimination. Both self-confidence and a propensity to take risks, according
to psychologists, are unequally distributed along racial, cultural, and gender
lines.5 Whether there are evolutionary or socially constructed explanations for
this is controversial but unimportant for the descriptive purpose I have here. 6
One can readily see how and why white males might have higher ratings on
each of these "egocentrism" scales. And if these traits are associated with
higher payoffs-that is, compensation of higher risk-taking and
aggressiveness-we would expect the eventual tournament survivors to fall
disproportionately into that profile. As a result, this would reinforce the
success stereotypes used in heuristic settings like hiring and early-stage
promotion.
Another survivorship trait closely reflects what Carbado and Gulati were
after and relates to the type of person who moves fluidly from point to point
within the firm. The need for teamwork has led some commentators in the
corporate field to predict that firms' internal norms, and presumably hiring and
54. On the spillover from this self-confidence, see generally Mathew L. A. Hayward &
Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining the PremiumsPaidfor LargeAcquisitions: Evidence ofCEO
Hubris, 42 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 103 (1997) (finding that indicators of CEO hubris were related to
high premiums paid for acquisitions).
55. For evidence regarding gender differences from a financial perspective, see generally
Brad M. Barber & Terrence Odean, Boys Will Be Boys: Gender,Overconfidence and Common
Stock Investment, 116 Q.J. ECON. 261 (2001) (documenting that men trade more aggressively
than women); Nancy Ammon Jianakoplos & Alexandra Bernasek, Are Women More Risk
Averse?, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 620 (1998) (finding that single women were relatively more risk
averse than single men). On cultural differences, see generally Elke U. Weber & Christopher
Hsee, Cross-Cultural Differences in Risk Perception, But Cross-CulturalSimilarities in
Attitudes TowardPerceivedRisk, 44 MGT. Sci. 1205 (1998) (finding cultural differences in risk
preferences associated primarily with cultural differences in the perception of risk rather than
cultural differences in attitudes toward perceived risk).
56. To be clear, I am by no means telling a story of "natural superiority." The tournament
created by the probationary crucibles is plainly a social construct, and the choice to reward
competitive success under a highly stylized set of rules of the game is far from inevitable. My
point is that once the internal promotion structure of the firm has developed in the way it has
(for whatever reason), it will tend to reward risktakers, which have an inflated self-confidence.
If those traits are distributed unevenly, the system will be deeply biased, and the bias will be
hard to eliminate without very aggressive intervention. Mild tweaking will not work, for
reasons beyond conventional stereotypes. To put it another way, the system's largely automatic
tilt favoring-both ex ante and expost-the psychological traits unevenly distributed to white
males creates one of the points of resistance that any effort to promote diversity will struggle to
overcome.
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promotion practices, will be heavily skewed to reward cooperators and weed
out the selfish.57 Based both on theory and anecdotal observation, this is
unlikely-though not completely off the mark. Remember that on a regular
basis managerial groups within the firm are disbanded so that loyalties must
shift to an entirely new group, never allowing people's attachments to become
too heavily encased in cement. Moreover, there is an important individual
element to the tournament; a competitive manager has to be savvy enough to
know how and when to defect quietly to impress superiors-that is, allow his or
her individualized traits to be observed when that is desirable.58 In addition, of
course, the manager must behave in a highly competitive, potentially aggressive
fashion toward any "out-group"-including former colleagues, perhaps-that is
perceived to be a rival. In this light, the image of the innate cooperator does not
quite describe the person likely to thrive.
Instead, the survivor is likely to be someone who can be both loyal and
opportunistic, a mix that requires quite a bit of cognitive multitasking. 9 The
egoist who simply fakes in-group loyalty is unlikely to survive scrutiny through
many iterations in the crucible. There are too many higher-ups who can spot
the selfishness and who fear that the quality would eventually pose a danger.
Loyalty is a bona fide survival trait. But it is one that has to be moderated in
those who want competitive success, and I would venture a guess that the
moderation comes in the form of the cluster of traits that psychologists label
"High Machiavellianism" or "high-Mach." 6 This kind of person deeply
understands the need for mutual support and teamwork and rewards those who
cooperate with intense loyalty as long as the cooperation has a positive payoff.
On the other hand, he or she will defect without guilt when there is a
compelling reason and the ability to do so without suffering a costly loss of
reputation. To manage this conflict,6 1 the high-Mach is unusually adept at
57. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Melvin Eisenberg, Fairness,Character,and Efficiency in
Firms, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1717, 1719-21 (2001) (noting that diligence and honest performance
of agents increases efficiency).
58. Cf Canice Prendergast, A Theory of "Yes Men", 83 Am.ECON. REv. 757,769 (1993)
(concluding that regarding workers on a subjective basis (effort or output) may induce them to
distort their work products to reflect what they believe their superiors want to hear, which will
result in inefficiencies in the form of less accurate work products as compared with workers who
are induced to tell the truth).
59. See Martin Kilduff & David V. Day, Do Chameleons Get Ahead? The Effects ofSelfMonitoring on ManagerialCareers,37 ACAD. MOT. J. 1047, 1055 (1994) (demonstrating that
"high self-motivators" are more willing to change employers to get ahead and are more likely to
be promoted).
60. Samuel Bowles et al., The Determinantsof Earnings: A BehavioralApproach, 39 J.
ECON. Lrr. 1137, 1161-62 (2001).
61. Psychologists tell us that the best actors are the ones who so internalize their roles that
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rationalizinga shift in loyalties, something that both deflects guilt and protects
one's reputation. Through the creative use of self-deception and influence
techniques, this kind of person can be adaptively flexible and very persuasive to
others. Self-interest and justifiable behavior blend seamlessly. 62 Research
suggests that high-Machs are disproportionately successful in sales and
marketing 63 and probably other highly competitive line and staff positions.
They can be very "focused"-another favorite in the human resources
playbook-precisely because of their disinclination to worry about
relationships, commitments, or ethical distractions when there is good reason to
move on. They are adept at emotional distance.
A distinction between "grease" and "grit" captures this style of
personality nicely. 64 "Greasy" people are those who are ethically and socially
nimble, able to make strong in-group connections-be stars at teamworkwhen it serves both their interests and the group's interest, as it so often will.
But they can move away without the heavy baggage of regret when the
economics dictate. Their skills accelerate the process of ongoing short-term
negotiations (perceptual as well as contractual) and are thus favored inside
the firm. In contrast, "gritty" people are those with the traits or preferences,
whether ethical or social, that make internal negotiations more difficult
because of the dissonance they introduce. If they slow things down in a high
velocity environment, they will be disfavored. Again, over time, tournament
survivors 65will disproportionately display favored tendencies. Grease wins
over grit.

they have no conscious awareness that they are deceiving anyone in the first place.
62. See George Loewenstein, BehavioralDecision Theory and Business Ethics: Skewed
Trade-Offs Between Self and Other, in CODES OF CONDUCr: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO

BusiNEss EThics 214, 221-23 (David Messick & Ann Tenbrunsel eds., 1996) (summarizing
research on rationalization and noting the "[i]t is by now well established that people tend to
conflate what is personally beneficial with what is fair or moral"). One mediating technique for
rationalizing defection is to think of the victims as deserving it because of their own disloyalty
to the group's goals. If that story is believed, others will not view the defection as inappropriate
because the victims brought it on themselves.
63. See Myron Gable & Frank Dangello, Locus of Control, Machiavellianism, and
ManagerialJob Perfonnance, 128 J. PSYCH. 599, 600 (1994) (noting that managers with highMach scores should be more effective than those with "lower-Mach" scores).
64. See Donald C. Langevoort, The OrganizationalPsychology of Hyper-Competition:
CorporateIrresponsibilityand the Lessons of Enron,70 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 968, 970 (2002)
(discussing personality characteristics, such as a high degree of self-confidence and ethical
plasticity, associated with advancement up the corporate hierarchy).
65. Obviously, too much grease is dangerous. What I am describing is a more controlled
form of plasticity.
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The diversity implications here are a bit more speculative but important.
Going back to the point about small group efficiency, there is some reason to
believe that the negotiation process is smoother when similar rather than
different people are involved; if so, there is a small amount of grit added simply
by being different. That certainly is the case if the person in question demands
to be authentic in those differences, 66 leading to the prediction that any diversity
that is pursued will be women and minorities who mimic white male traits,
including negative stereotyping of other women and minorities. 67 The loyalty
dimension is more ambiguous. If loyalty or connectedness were all that was at
stake, then research would by no means suggest a white male advantage. But if
the adaptive trait is something more plastic-strong, quick bonds, but only when
delivering a positive payoff, coupled with an ability to be extremely aggressive
vis-4-vis out-group members, including former associates--then that advantage
might have at least a gender bias, if not a racial one. It is quite possible that white
males on average score higher on the grease scale.68
If the latter is true, then any survivorship bias derived from the first two
traits, overconfidence and a taste for risk, is strengthened. As far as diversity and
discrimination are concerned, we can draw a couple of inferences. First, the
obvious: We now have further reason to fear that the closer we look at the
internal workings of the firm, the more we see why, on average, white male traits
might generate positive abnormal returns (at compound interest) the longer the
tournament goes on, predicting survivorship quite apart from the effects of
stereotyped perception. Moreover, any effort to eradicate this bias will encounter
resistance on competitive grounds as a result. Hence, we cannot be overly
optimistic about "tweaking" strategies when compared to more aggressive
intervention to promote diversity and nondiscrimination. Second, we have a
troubling externality as to the personality type most likely to hold the reins of
power in a firm. If a bias toward overconfidence, risk-taking, and ethical
plasticity-however efficient inside the tournament structure-is socially

66. See Devon W. Carbado & G. Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REv.
1259, 1263-66 (2000) (discussing the costs associated with asserting individual characteristics
that are contrary to the work identity); Wilkins, supra note 18, at 1587 (noting that "conflicts
and communication issues" impact diverse groups).
67. See generally Naomi Ellemers et al., Sticking Together or FallingApart: In-Group
Identification as a Psychological Determinant of Group Commitment Versus Individual
Mobility, 72 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 617 (1997).
68. See Linda K. Stroh et al., All the Right Stuff. A Comparison of Female and Male
Managers' CareerProgression,77 J. App. PSYCH. 251,257-58 (1992) (noting that women who
have equal qualifications and follow similar career paths as men continue to receive lower
salaries).
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troublesome because of the externalities associated with the kinds of business
decisions the bias generates, then diversity initiatives might have a positive effect
by neutralizing some of this bias.
III Finn-Wide Efficiency
What was suggested above is a form of adaptation within the internal
promotion structure of the firm. Certain traits lead to survivorship, meaning that
there is a positive payoff to the individual who possesses them inside internal
labor markets. This conclusion, however, does not necessarily mean that the
same structure-favoring those who exhibit excessive optimism, have a relatively
high risk-tolerance, and are ethically flexible--has a positive payoff for the
company as a whole. 69 Perhaps, as Bob Cooter and Mel Eisenberg argue,70 firms
would prefer internal norms that reflect more stringent habits of character and
integrity and thus would seek to counter the biases built into the tournament
structure by revising the firm's hiring and promotion practices.
While there is no hard evidence one way or the other, there is no reason to
predict with any confidence that the tournament structure I have describedhowever troubling from a societal perspective-is maladaptive at the level of the
firm. Translating individual personality traits into indicators of finn-wide
performance is difficult, of course, 71 but the first two traits described earlier,
optimism and high risk-tolerance, are likely to have the same kinds of positive
payoffs when embedded in the firm's senior management culture with respect to
competition among firms as it does for managers internally. 72 That is, a firm that
perseveres, acts aggressively, and takes calculated risks will, on average, be

69. It is well recognized that organizations have to counteract the cognitive biases of
individual employees to some degree. See, e.g., Chip Heath et al., Cognitive Repairs: How
OrganizationalPracticesCan Compensate for Individual Shortcomings, 20 RES. ON ORG.
BEHAV. 1, 6-7 (1993) (noting how individuals often attribute their success to stable, internal
factors, while attributing their failures to unstable, environmental factors and discussing the
need for organizations to counteract or repair this self-serving bias to ensure that success is not
simply due to luck or other external factors).
70. See Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 1726-28 (noting that screening and
filtering are more effective methods for assuring good agent character than education or
socialization).
71. See Barry M. Staw & Robert I. Sutton, Macro OrganizationalPsychology, in SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 350, 350-51 (J. Keith
Mumighan ed., 1993) (noting the lack of research into using psychological theory to understand
organizational-level behavior).
72. See Langevoort, supranote 27, at 152-56 (discussing adaptive biases, particularly the
relationship between optimism, risk-taking activity, and success).
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rewarded. While there may not be a tight coupling between internal promotion
policies and the establishment of firm-wide habits, one should not bet against it.
As to ethical plasticity, the conclusion is much the same. Firms need to be
sensitive to external demands for legitimate behavior in setting policy but are
more profitable, on average, if they construe what is legitimate with a self-serving
bias. Of course, if we are right about whom the survivors of the firm's internal
promotion tournament are likely to be, this plasticity will come naturally.
IV. Self-Serving Resistance
Now let us turn to what the foregoing means for nondiscrimination. We
cannot, in the name of diversity, claim that these deep biases need to be
eradicated simply to gain firm-wide efficiency. We should not dismiss that
possibility, but the affirmative case is difficult to demonstrate to anyone not
predisposed toward it. The likely payoffs to homogeneity are too strong. Thus,
any effort to push diversity must be based on other reasoning. Here we return
to the possibilities mentioned earlier. One is because the law demands it-a
proposition undermined if the law takes a strong stand only against overt
discrimination, as it does today.73 Another is because diversity makes the
company more legitimate in the eyes of key constituents. The third is because
diversity may be a business necessity in order to attract the quantity of skilled
managers needed to survive or prosper. Initiatives driven by these forces are
what Susan Sturm explores so well in her article.74
If there is one thing clear in the business literature, it is that senior
management errs severely if it assumes that because it is convinced that a
certain initiative is good for the firm, employees will see it the same way. Of
course, executives realize that employees may resist an initiative because it is
not in their self-interest. But they assume that employees are aware of their
selfishness, privately at least, and so assume that management has the moral
high ground in the ensuing battle and can use guilt as a tactic for overcoming

73. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161,
1247-48 (1995) (suggesting that many biased employment decisions result from a variety of
unintentional categorization-related judgment errors rather than, as legal interpretation of Title
VII assumes, a conscious discriminatory purpose, and arguing that, if Title VII is to retain its
effectiveness, this legal assumption must change). See generallyCharles R. Lawrence LI, The
Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with UnconsciousRacism, in FOUNDATIONS OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 122, 124-25 (John J. Donahue II ed., 1997).
74. See generally Sturm, supra note 17.
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the employees' resistance. Top-down initiatives often have a preachy quality to
them.7"
Research counsels otherwise. As with many people, resistant managers
are likely to convince themselves that what they believe is right and reasonable
and denigrate
senior management's motives to the extent that they are
threatening. 76 Much work on affirmative action falls into this category; people
opposed to it both articulate and convince themselves that they have the moral
high ground. As Christopher Federico and Jim Sidanius claim, 77 this may be
self-deception-the principled objections really do reflect a self-serving desire
to maintain dominance-but it is no less convincing to the holder of that
viewpoint. Attitude change is unlikely. I suspect that the same would be true
of insistence to white or male managerial employees that a diversity-based
initiative is a business necessity. That is just as likely to provoke the belief that
the initiative is being imposed for illegitimate political reasons or external
pressures that will not serve the company's best interests. It will take better
advocacy than that to reduce resistance or induce cooperation.7 8

75. As with many corporate governance and management-style activities, these may be
easy to promote disingenuously. See, e.g., James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, The Symbolic
Management of Stockholders: CorporateGovernanceReforms and ShareholderReactions, 43
ADMIN. Sci. Q. 127, 129-35 (1998) (discussing a corporate trend towards announcing long-term
incentive plans thought to focus executives on longer-term goals but making either no
implementation or only trivial implementation in order to gain favorable market treatment at
minimal cost and risk). For a critical exploration of compliance initiatives along these lines,
including those in the nondiscrimination area, see generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic
Complianceand the Failureof Negotiated Governance,81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003) (arguing
that internal compliance programs and corporate conduct codes may lead to under enforcement
and under deterrence).
76. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (explaining the self-serving
rationalization process that some employees experience in pursuit of success).
77. See generally Christopher M. Federico & Jim Sidanius, Racism, Ideology and
Affirmative Action Revisited: The Antecedents and Consequences of "PrincipledObjections" to
Affirmative Action, 82 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 488 (2002).
78. In addition, political ideology can come into play in business settings. A disposition
to conservatism inclines people to reject psychologically grounded "excuses" for decisions in
favor of an inflated vision of merit and just dessert. In other words, conservatives tend to doubt
the existence and relevance of cognitive biases. See Phillip E. Tetlock, Cognitive Biases and
Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease and Cure Depend on the Politics of the
Beholder?, 45 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 293,320-24 (2000) (discussing the correlation between political
viewpoint and management style).
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V. Constructive Intervention
Having suggested something about the likely depth of resistance diversitybased initiatives are likely to face in many firms, I now want to return to
Sturm's account of the success of "problem-solving" kinds of programs at
Deloitte, Intel, and Home Depot. My purpose here is to push harder on the
question of what forces might have contributed to the apparent success of these
programs and connect some possible answers to broader issues that have
emerged at the corporate governance and human resources nexus.
At the risk of clinging too long to the pessimistic side of the story, I will
start with an observation made by Sturm's interviewees twice in her account:
Corporate executives do not "purchase" diversity-based compliance programs
willingly, even when persuaded in the abstract of their value. It takes the threat
of a lawsuit or some forceful top-down command to get their attention. 79 The
two people quoted both identify "short-term" performance pressure on line
managers as the motivating reason to pursue these programs.8 0 This concern, of
course, goes far beyond diversity-based compliance to an issue at the heart of
corporate governance. At the highest levels of the firm, is there a systemic bias
toward hitting quarterly earnings and revenues targets that distracts
management from longer-term investments? In the empirical literature, this is a
matter of some controversy but is at least a possibility. 8'
My sense is that pushing down the responsibility for diversity and
nondiscrimination to the more local level exacerbates this possibility. A
delegation of this kind would not be surprising; most human resources issues

79. See Sturm, supra note 17, at 532-33 (describing a suit brought by African-American
employees getting the attention of Southern California Edison).
80. Id. at 499 n.145, 543 n.314. Psychologists and economists have uncovered much
evidence showing that we are already biased toward the short-term. See, e.g., Shane Frederick
et al., Time Discountingand Time Preference: A CriticalReview, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 351,366-77,
389-93 (2002) (discussing alternative models to predict economic decisions over time and how
various personality traits and life experiences may combine to influence future choices).
81. See, e.g., Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient CapitalMarkets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of
Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. ECON. 655, 661-76 (1989) (arguing that greater
managerial concern over stock prices leads to a greater tendency to take a short-term myopic
approach toward investing corporate funds); Anjan V. Thakor, Investment "Myopia" and the
Internal Organization of Capital Allocation Decisions, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 129, 143-45
(1990) (arguing that biases toward short-term investments are imposed on corporations by the
capital market's preference toward current shareholders). From a legal perspective, see
generally Henry T. C. Hu, Risk, Time and FiduciaryPrinciples in CorporateInvestment, 38
UCLA L. REV. 277 (1990) (critiquing the presumption of overly risk-averse corporate behavior,
advocating policies that encourage corporations to behave to maximize theoretical perfectmarket stock value, and eliminating accounting-based biases).
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are implemented at the middle-management level, with only general statements
of direction from above. If middle managers have discretionary responsibility
over implementing diversity, then the simple question is whether the way in
which we measure their success encourages long-term investments. On a
variety of grounds, there is reason to doubt it. Most obviously, if their
performance is based on easily generated financial metrics, long-term diversity
payoffs are unlikely to be captured as anything but a drag. 2 Some of the
managers Sturm interviewed made this point explicitly.8 3 What I would add
here is the exacerbating effect of the tournament structure I emphasized in the
previous sections. If managers are rotated frequently through different
assignments, with promotion decisions based on methods that overvalue the
most recent experience, then there is an additional reason to expect disinterest
in diversity investments. Even if they do pay off eventually, it will become too
late to have an effect on the career of the innovator and be easy for the
innovator's successor to appropriate as his or her own. If that is the incentive
structure, then middle managers will--through rationalization and self-serving
inference-attend to other priorities and ignore the generalized direction from
above. In other words, the tournament structure contributes to line-level shorttermism, encouraging the use of grease and an aversion to grit in local
decisions.
In Sturm's descriptions of Intel and Deloitte, in particular, we see different
kinds of interventions designed to trump this effect. Deloitte's program,
designed to increase the number of women in high-powered consulting
positions at the firm, begins by eschewing localism-it was distinctly a topdown initiative managed by the firm's chief executive, albeit with widespread
involvement from subordinates in its formulation (a subject explored in more
detail below), s4 More importantly, perhaps, it worked toward the development
85
of highly objective benchmarks that line managers were instructed to meet.
Though not quotas, I suspect that the benchmarks came close to being that. In
sum, this was a very aggressive intervention that worked directly at the
incentive level within the firm.
Intel's intervention was different and somewhat softer.8 6 Its design was
to bypass line managers by creating a separate and powerful locus of
82. See Sturm, supra note 17, at 543 (discussing corporate tendencies to ignore issues that
do not impact the short-term bottom line).
83. Id. at 543 n.314.
84. See id. at 492-99 (describing Deloitte & Touche CEO Mike Cook's personal
involvement in the efforts to increase retention of women).
85. Id. at 496 n.126.
86. See id. at 499-509 (describing Intel's Human Resources reorganization).
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authority-the human resources and legal staffs-that had the ability to
intervene to improve the quality and fairness of work for its increasingly
diverse, highly skilled employees. What is noteworthy here is the power. In
contrast to monitoring and compliance groups in many other firms, 7 this group
could override self-serving line-manager decisions. Interestingly, Intel does not
limit this to employment practices; its antitrust compliance program is also
unique in its aggressively interventionist tactics."8
Both Intel and Deloitte depend on one thing in particular to make these
interventions effective: information. Sturm rightly emphasizes the importance
of this. 9 If I am right that there is an embedded efficiency bias toward grease
rather than grit, which diversity initiatives threaten, then the system's
inclination will be to obscure practices that contribute toward discrimination
rather than to expose them. Those with power have no incentive to generate
hard data but rather will try to rationalize the process with window-dressing
symbols of compliance designed to deflect attention away from any embedded
problems. 90 Intel and Deloitte used sophisticated management information
system (MIS) techniques to monitor outcomes, thereby avoiding reliance on
self-serving statements of compliance from below.
This brings us to an important connection between corporate governance
and human resources and a promising area for future inquiry. There is a
familiar phrase that "you manage what you measure."9 ' In a system in which
metrics are almost exclusively in the form of conventional financial accounting,
the incentives are biased toward meeting and exceeding those accounting
benchmarks used for promotion and compensation, in whatever time periods
chosen for those measurements. We understand the imprecision or artificiality
of many of these measures yet still use them because they are conventionally
understood as the best measures available.
87. See Langevoort, supra note 46, at 101 (describing the optimal strategy within
compliance structures of reliance on line supervision monitoring, "backed up by lowpowered ...

compliance specialists").

88. See David B. Yoffie & Mary Kwak, Playing By the Rules: How Intel Avoids Antitrust
Litigation, HARv. Bus. REv., June 2001, at 119, 120-21 (describing Intel's antitrust law
compliance strategies in which internal standards are designed to avoid both clear violations and

legal "gray-areas").
89.

See Sturm, supra note 17, at 519-20 (discussing traits the successful case studies have

in common).
90. See Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of
Organizations,23 ANN. REv. Soc. 479,487-92 (1997) (describing the behavior of materialistic
corporations).
91. See Louis Lowenstein, FinancialTransparencyand Corporate Governance: You
Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1335, 1335 (1996) (discussing the effects of

financial disclosure on corporate management).
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What accountants, business people, and others interested in corporate
governance are now coming to appreciate is that advances in information
technology invite a new search for better metrics of corporate performance. By
all accounts, conventional accounting and MIS fail to capture the connection
between human resources activities within the firm and the firm's productivity
and also fail to capture practices that lead to innovation and the creation of
intellectual property. But, a good bit of recent work makes these measurements
more sophisticated.92 As these metrics develop, we should see more sunlight
shed on human resources practices-including diversity-based ones-that will
afford us a greater understanding of their efficiency implications.
This, in turn, will bring human resources practices closer to the orthodox
concern of the corporate law scholar, the capital marketplace. Over the last few
years, a number of people interested in corporate disclosure have been
considering the possibility that, if standardized metrics that capture human
resources-and intellectual property-practices within the firm can be
developed, they should be made publicly available, just as financial accounting
data is today. 93 Thus, investment decisions would be affected by-and reward
or punish-either superior or inferior performance on these standards. While I
remain skeptical that objective metrics for all corporations will be easy to
derive, 94 I have no doubt that the exploration is worthwhile and, if successful,
would have a dramatic influence on behavior.
If so, we could indeed learn much about diversity and nondiscrimination.
We could find more sensitive correlations between diversity initiatives and
measures of productivity. To be sure, this may not bring welcome news; in
other areas of corporate governance, studies often failed to support the
connection between seemingly desirable organizational changes-like
independent boards of directorsgS-and firm profitability. We might, in other
92.

See, e.g., Jacques Mairesse & Pierre Mohnen, Accounting for Innovation and

Measuring Innovativeness: An Illustrative Frameworkand Illustration,92 AM. ECON. REV.
(PAPERS & PROC.) 226, 226-27 (2002) (proposing an accounting framework for innovation).
93. See UNSEEN WEALTH: REPORT OFTHE BROOKINGS TASK FORCE ON INTANGIBLES 57-71

(Margaret Blair & Steven Wallman, co-chairs, 2001) (recommending a regulatory framework to
expand economic reporting to include intangibles in a regular and regulated manner).
94. As with many corporate governance and management-style activities, these may be
easy to promote disingenuously. See, e.g., Westphal & Zajac, supra note 75, at 129-35
(discussing a corporate trend toward announcing long-term incentive plans thought to focus
executives on longer-term goals but making either no implementation or only trivial
implementation in order to gain favorable market treatment at minimal cost and risk).
95. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The UncertainRelationshipBetween Board
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAW. 921, 944-50 (1999) (finding no positive
correlation between an independent board of directors and firm profitability). For a study of
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words, find that grease-laden firms are efficient competitors, so that diversity
has to be justified as good for the public rather than good for business.
Whatever the eventual outcome of this public disclosure inquiry, Sturm is
right that private data-tracking efforts, which can be customized on a firm-byfirm basis, are the key to any effort to overcome internal resistance to diversity
initiatives. 96 Once senior management decides to commit the firm to diversity,
objective performance indicators are essential to expose the self-serving
rationalizations bound to emerge from below. Information alone, however, is
no solution. If there is resistance to the implementation of diversity initiatives,
it must be countered. Data provides crucial intelligence, but it takes the
exercise of either power or persuasion-skillful negotiating-to obtain good
outcomes.
The Deloitte experience exemplifies the deft use of power. 97 The chief
executive officer took personal control over the implementation of the firm's
diversity task force, which in turn set fairly specific performance benchmarks
bolstered by detailed information gathering to monitor compliance. That, I
suspect, is a rather rare occurrence. Most CEOs are unwilling to take that sort
of risk or devote enough time and attention to the task. They may take
symbolic steps along those lines, but without substance. Indeed, if I am right
about biases in the promotion tournament that lead to an excess of ethically
plastic Machiavellianism in the executive suite, we have no reason to expect a
genuine commitment to the effort as opposed to a strategic preference for
maintaining as greasy a system as possible consistent with whatever
prodiversity needs the firm faces. And, whatever commitment there is might
not be long-lived.
Even where there is the exercise of top-down power, some unintended
consequences are likely. Imagine that we have a CEO who is committedpresumably for competitive reasons-to increasing diversity. As noted
earlier, employees threatened by these initiatives are likely to feel no
trends and fads in managerial behavior, see Mark J. Zbaracki, The RhetoricandReality of Total
QualityManagement, 43 ADMIN. Sdi. Q. 602, 612-29 (1998) (discussing the adoption of Total
Quality Management programs at several institutions). Notwithstanding, managers are often
highly evaluated and compensated for being on top of the latest "learning." See Barry M. Staw
& Lisa D. Epstein, What BandwagonsBring: Effects of PopularManagement Techniques on
CorporatePerformance,Reputation, and CEO Pay, 45 ADMIN. Scl. Q. 523, 542-44 (2000)
(discussing positive correlations between implementation of popular business techniques, such
as Total Quality Management, and CEO pay, regardless of actual business performance).
96. See Sturm, supra note 17, at 519-20 (discussing traits the successful case studies cited
have in common).
97. See id. at 492-93 (describing the Deloitte CEO's personal efforts to address the
company's gender problems).
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guilt in their resistance or opposition; they will rationalize their response in
principled terms, however self-serving the underlying motivation. Any
authoritarian effort to overcome this resistance, although possibly successful in
forcing the desired outcome, is likely to lead to a reduction in the motivation
and morale of the employees whose will was overborne. This is another reason,
I suspect, that top-down initiatives are often more symbolic than real; many
executives, especially in highly competitive firms, fear the indirect productivity
losses that flow from the winning of the immediate battle. Internal motivation
is one of the operational imperatives in many organizations and is not readily
98
put at risk.
The more common technique for implementing a diversity initiative is to
delegate it to some combination of legal and human resources specialists, as
Intel did. That is dangerous, of course, for it can mean a loss of authority,
unless there is some mechanism by which the CEO stands behind this group
(which just created an indirect form of what we have just discussed). In many
industries, we observe relatively low-powered compliance groups, which are
likely to police only for fairly egregious violations that unambiguously threaten
the firm's self-interest. Beyond that, their task is to create the appearance of
attention to legal norms to protect the firm from charges of wholesale
indifference. It is largely window dressing.
Sociologists, however, point out that this kind of impotence by designthough probably common-is not inevitable. In a well-known series of
articles, Lauren Edelman and her colleagues studied the implementation of
EEOC directives in firms. Because EEOC directives are ambiguous except
when directed at conduct that is blatantly discriminatory, firms responding to
them have a range of possible responses. One-found fairly often-was
symbolic compliance without taking any steps that pose a serious threat to
managerial discretion." But their field studies were not entirely pessimistic.
98. See Langevoort, supra note 46, at 96-99 (describing loss of motivation as an indirect
cost imposed by conflict and hostility between employees and compliance officers).
99. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures:
OrganizationalMediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. Soc. 1531, 1538-47 (1992) (arguing
that managerial desire to simultaneously avoid the perceived negative impacts of equal
employment opportunity law and to appear to be in compliance with the law encourages a
strategy of emphasizing procedure over substance and appearance over reality); Lauren B.
Edelman et al., Legal Ambiguity and the Politicsof Compliance: Affirmative Action Officers'
Dilemma, 13 LAw & POL'Y 73, 90-92 (1991) (analyzing strategies that various affirmative
action officers adopt to cope with competing demands from minorities and administrators);
Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as
RationalMyth, 105 AM. J. Soc. 406,445-49 (1999) (discussing how "rational myths" about the
law in the employment practices context, as organizations seek the appearance of compliance,
can become the economic and legal reality).
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A natural consequence of delegating compliance to a professional group, even
if it lacked power initially, was that the group would seek to expand its power.
And, in the equal employment opportunity area, at least, such groups have been
fairly savvy.
One tactic is message sharpening. Where the law is relatively ambiguous,
a professional group can claim exclusive expertise over the interpretive process
and choose an interpretation that overstates the law's demands.'1 With that
interpretation as a club, the group gains more power simply because of the
perception that the firm has no choice but to comply and must rely on the group
to manage the compliance process.
Professional groups within the firm also use social networks to their
advantage. By making allies with a variety of groups outside the firm
(compliance officials in other firms, organizations devoted to promoting
compliance, and others), the inside professionals have a couple of advantages.
First, they gain support for their construals of the law's demands-professional
organizations can endorse aggressive readings of the law, which can then be
cited internally as authority. Second, to the extent that other firms have
engaged in stronger compliance steps, the professional network can identify
and highlight them, creating pressure on others to conform. These professional
networks have shown surprising strength in causing what sociologists call
"mimetic" responses.' 0 And once a few firms mimic the innovator, the
pressure on the others increases that much more.
Sturm's account of Deloitte's experience reveals a fairly savvy use of
professional networking. 0 2 Outside organizations devoted to improving the
status of women in business firms were involved in the design and monitoring
of the Women's Initiative10 3-a classic use of a bonding device designed to
increase the threat to the reputation of the company should there be any
100. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., ProfessionalConstruction of Law: The Inflated Threat
of Wrongful Discharge,26 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 47, 57-62, 71-75 (1992) (discussing how the
threat to employers from wrongful discharge suits has been exaggerated by misleading data and
hyperbolic language, in part to increase demand for lawyers); see also Donald C. Langevoort &
Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in TransmittingLegal Rules,
5 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 375,392-99 (1997) (predicting that lawyers will often overstate legal
risks to clients when giving legal advice because incentives to overstate far outweigh incentives
to be accurate).
101. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in OrganizationalFields,48 AM. Soc. REv. 147, 15052 (1983) (describing "mimetic" isomorphism as a result of responses to uncertainty that, along
with coercive and normative processes, results in great similarities among institutions).
102. See Sturm, supra note 17, at 498-99 (describing the use of external professional
networking groups at Deloitte).
103. ld.
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backsliding. Sturm characterizes these external advisory groups as ones that
both "provided a continual source of reflection and protected the process from
internal capture." °4 Sturm's description of Home Depot relates a similar
bonding effort using outside interest
groups, largely a spillover from the class
10 5
action that led to the reforms.
I suspect that the clever inside group can sometimes even turn window
dressing into substance. Imagine, as is probably fairly common, a diversity
initiative by senior management designed to counter negative attention or a
symbolic lawsuit, creating minimal interference with greasy patterns of bias
deep within the company. One strategy would be to declare this program a
model and invite close external scrutiny by the press, interest groups, and
others. That by itself probably would cause pressure to generate observable
results. The risk, of course, is that senior management will consider this to be
insubordination and punish the prodiversity group. If senior management is
strongly opposed to substantial change, that risk will no doubt deter much
experimentation. But this opposition might be softened by a gradual approach
and a careful attribution of credit for the initiative to the CEO or board
members. This is simple influence utilizing cognitive dissonance. 106 Inducing
small steps of commitment by the CEO-bolstered by positive feedback--can
provoke an attitude shift that may lead to more substantial support for the
initiative.

°7

The point here goes back to my metaphor of the firm as a nexus of
negotiations. The promotion of diversity may or may not hold a position of
power within the firm. If I am right about the usual efficiency of grease over
grit, its power rarely will be great. Simple demands of adherence because of
the rightness of the cause are unlikely to provoke a cooperative response among
those who disagree on (perhaps self-serving) principled grounds.108 That is bad
negotiation, though a tactic that comes naturally to many lawyers. It leads to
reactive devaluation. A good negotiator knows how to leverage the
104.
105.

Id. at 499.
Id. at 516-17.

106.

See, e.g., ROBERT CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 17-55

(1993) (discussing reciprocation as a major psychological method used to gain compliance from
others).
107. Id. at 57-111 (citing the use ofthe natural desire to be seen as consistent as a tool that
can cause changes in self-image and in attitude both in the marketplace and in political
philosophy).
108. See Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni et al., Barriersto Resolution in IdeologicallyBased
Negotiations: The Role of Values and Institutions, 27 ACAD. MGT. REV. 41, 43-47 (2002)
(discussing problems raised in negotiations caused by different initial moral and ideological
positions in a personal and institutional context).
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legitimacy of what she is claiming and find ways of reducing, if not
eliminating, the coercive message in a demand.
In sum, diversity is something that typically has to be sold to other interest
groups within the firm, some of which will be resistant for the reasons
discussed. The sales pitch has to be devised so as to minimize the threat of
disempowerment. One tried technique, of course, is to characterize diversity as
plainly good for productivity, whether or not the empirical reality clearly
supports the inference. Holding out the promise that these returns, once they
arrive, will be broadly shared-even if invoking something of an illusionmight be the kind of message that would work by increasing the perceived size
of the profits pie. The kind of co-optation that can be practiced on senior
management might also be effective as applied to potential sources of resistance
at lower levels in the organization. Key groups, one small step at a time, could
be brought into the planning and implementation of diversity initiatives in such
a way that they would be credited for lowering their resistance, and in the
process, giving them a psychological stake in the program's success. These
techniques are well known in the human resources and organizational behavior
literature and presumably taught to professionals in those fields. I will leave
their elaboration to others who know them better. My point here is that they
also have both a legal compliance and a corporate governance function, once
we see both compliance and governance through the wide-angled lens of the
theory of the firm. In other words, they illustrate well an area that can be
understood much better by merging learning from both corporate governance
and human resources.

